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EVIDENCE-INCIDENTS OF SHOPLIFTING NOT PROBATIVE OF
TRUTHFULNESS UNDER RULE 608(b). Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark.
203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (1982).
Chester Earl Rhodes was convicted in Washington County Cir-
cuit Court of capital felony murder.' The evidence at trial estab-
lished that Rhodes and an accomplice, Juanita Carr, went to Roland
Kelley's house to collect money which Kelley owed Carr. Earlier
that day, Carr, then a prostitute, had engaged in sexual relations
with Kelley, for which he had failed to pay. Carr testified for the
prosecution saying that while she and Rhodes were at Kelley's
home, Rhodes beat Kelley to death with a board and took sixty-five
dollars and his wallet.
Rhodes' attorney sought to impeach Carr's credibility by in-
quiring about prior instances of shoplifting for which she had not
been convicted. He asserted that the jury should be informed about
Carr's course of conduct, including the shoplifting incidents, so they
could accurately assess her credibility. The trial court disagreed and
ruled that Rhodes' attorney could not inquire about prior instances
of shoplifting. Appellant contended that the trial court's ruling im-
properly limited his cross-examination under Rule 608(b) of the Ar-
kansas Uniform Rules of Evidence.2
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that,
under existing case law,3 the trial court committed prejudicial error
by improperly limiting the scope of the appellant's cross-examina-
tion. The court remanded the case for a new trial but also an-
1. Rhodes was charged with violation of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1501 (1977), which
provides in pertinent part: "A person commits capital murder if ... he commits or at-
tempts to commit ... robbery ... and in the course of and in furtherance of the felony...
he or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life ....
2. ARK. UNIF. R. EVID. 608(b) provides in pertinent part:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or sup-
porting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the
court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-ex-
amination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has
testified.
3. Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979) (holding that inquiry could
be made into the act of theft under Rule 608(b)).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
nounced a prospective modification of its previous interpretation of
Rule 608(b). In the future a cross-examiner will not be permitted to
inquire into specific instances of misconduct which are not clearly
probative of dishonesty. Specifically, a cross-examiner will not be
permitted to inquire into acts of shoplifting for which there has been
no conviction. Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107
(1982).
In early English trial procedure, a witness' credibility could not
be impeached through inquiry into prior acts of misconduct. 4 Dur-
ing the 1700's, however, English courts took the opposite approach
and gave cross-examiners virtually unrestricted freedom in ques-
tioning, allowing inquiry into any act for the purpose of discrediting
the witness.5 Courts invested counsel with the responsibility of us-
ing their own discretion in formulating questions. When a court did
intervene, the admonition was to ask relevant questions more pro-
bative of the trait of veracity.6 Today, the rule in England remains
liberal. Cross-examiners are allowed to ask about any prior miscon-
duct in order to discredit the witness' character for truthfulness.'
In the United States, the rules differed from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction. The majority rule in the federal courts was that a witness
could not be asked about prior bad acts which had not resulted in
convictions.8 A minority of federal courts permitted cross-examin-
ers to inquire about prior bad acts but extrinsic evidence could not
be introduced to prove the act.9 Unlike the majority of federal
courts, most state courts, including Arkansas, allowed some form of
4. Onbie's Case, March 83, pl. 136 (K.B. 1643) as cited in 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 986 (Chadbom rev. 1970).
5. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 4.
6. Thomas Hardy's Trial, 24 How. St. Tr. 199, 719 (1794) as cited in 3A J. WIGMORE,
supra note 4.
7. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 983; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 42 (2d ed.
Cleary 1972).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Randolph, 403 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1968); Tafoya v. United States, 386 F.2d 537 (10th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1034 (1968); Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir.
1961); United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954); Campion v. Brooks Transporta-
tion Co., 135 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Scaffidi v. United States, 37 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1930);
Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1927); Terzo v. United States, 9 F.2d 357 (8th
Cir. 1925); Glover v. United States, 147 F. 426 (8th Cir. 1906). See generally K. REDDEN
AND S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 312 (2d ed. 1977).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 496 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Butler,
481 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1941): Coulston
v. United States, 51 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1931). See generally K. REDDEN AND S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 8, at 312.
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cross-examination about acts relevant to veracity.' 0 Acts such as
larceny, " embezzlement,' 2 and stealing money,'3 inter alia, were
held to indicate a lack of veracity and, thus, inquiry about them was
permissible.
The adoption in 1975 of Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence codified the federal minority view by allowing cross-ex-
amination into a witness' specific instances of misconduct which are
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. " However, under Rule
608(b), inquiry into prior acts of misconduct probative of truthful-
ness is not an absolute right. The advisory committee report accom-
panying Rule 608 indicates that judicial discretion is to be exercised
by balancing prejudice against probative value of the particular
act.' 5 Rule 608 is subject to Rules 40316 and 61 1,17 although they are
not expressly mentioned in the language of Rule 608. Rule 403
states that relevant evidence may be excluded if the prejudice that
may accompany the admission of the evidence substantially out-
weighs the probative value of the evidence. '8 Rule 611 states, inter
10. See McAlister v. State, 99 Ark. 604, 139 S.W. 684 (1911); Territory v. Chavez, 8
N.M. 528, 45 P. 1107 (1896); Buel v. State, 104 Wis. 132, 80 N.W. 78 (1899). See also K.
REDDEN AND S. SALTZBURG, supra note 8.
11. Oxier v. United States, 1 Indian Terr. 85, 38 S.W. 331 (1896).
12. People v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 710 (1879).
13. Hawaii v. Luning, 11 Hawaii 390 (1898).
14. Although the minority view was adopted in Rule 608(b), it was done with little
discussion because the attention of the legislature was focused on Rule 609, which provides
for impeachment with evidence of certain types of criminal convictions. Rule 609 provoked
much controversy because there was support for two opposing views on the rule, which
tended to overshadow any controversy over Rule 608(b). K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 8. See also 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 303 (1979 &
Supp. 1982).
Rule 608(b), in essence, followed one of three approaches recognized by commentators
on evidence on the issue of what type of acts may be inquired about on cross-examination.
That approach allows inquiry into only that misconduct which indicates a lack of veracity
such as fraud, forgery and perjury. Another approach allows inquiry into any kind of mis-
conduct, including such acts as robbery, assault, or adultery even though none of these di-
rectly indicate a lack of truthfulness. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra at § 305; 3A J.
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 982. The third and middle-ground approach, allows inquiry into
acts showing a disregard for the property rights of others, but disallows inquiry into acts
showing only a vicious dispositions. Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L.
REV. 166, 180 (1940).
15. FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee note.
16. FED. R. EVID. 403.
17. FED. R. EVID. 611.
18. A question may be permissible under Rule 608(b) and still be excluded under Rule
403 which reads:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
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alia, that the courts shall have control over the interrogation of
witnesses. '9
Federal courts interpreting Rule 608(b) have decided on a case
by case basis which specific acts bear upon the issue of veracity.2 °
For example, the federal courts have specifically held the following
acts probative of truthfulness under Rule 608(b): submission of a
false excuse for being absent from work,2' an attempted swindle,22
and false statements on an employment application 23 or in a letter to
a government agency. 24 In United States v. Leake,25 the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals said, "Rule 608 authorizes inquiry only into
instances of misconduct that are 'clearly probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness,' such as perjury, fraud, swindling, forgery, bribery,
and embezzlement. 26 The court went on to hold that the witness'
activities, including obtaining money under false pretenses, de-
frauding an innkeeper, having numerous default judgments against
him in civil actions seeking repayment of loans, and fraudulent con-
tracting, had a bearing upon his credibility. On the other hand,
federal courts have held that the following acts are not probative of
truthfulness under Rule 608(b): drug transactions, 28 sodomy,29 of-
fering to pay money to have a person killed,3 ° issuance of checks
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence.
19. Under Rule 611 the court is given control over cross-examinations conducted pursu-
ant to Rule 608. Rule 611 reads in pertinent part:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogat-
ing witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and pres-
entation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embar-
rassment ...Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on
direct examination.
20. The courts have had to make their determinations on a case by case basis because
the circumstances and characteristics of each act have been of vital importance in their
decisions.
21. United States v. Cole, 617 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1980).
22. United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1978).
23. Lewis v. Baker, 526 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. United States v. Reid, 634 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980).
25. 642 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 718.
27. Id. at 719.
28. United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Hastings, 577
F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1978).
29. United States v. Rabinowitz, 578 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1978).
30. United States v. Young, 567 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1079
(1978).
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checks with insufficient funds in the bank,3' assault, 32 and arrest for
civil tax problems.33
The majority of states which have adopted the Uniform Rules
of Evidence34  follow Rule 608 verbatim or with only minor
changes.35 These states basically interpret the rule in the same way
as the federal courts.36
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence in
1976, Arkansas, like most state courts, allowed cross-examination
upon the subject of prior bad acts.37 Among the acts into which
inquiry could be made were acts that today would be classified as
theft under the Arkansas Criminal Code.38 For example, in Bank of
Ha9eld v. Chatham ,39 the witness was asked on cross-examination
if he had taken money from another man's bank account. The
supreme court held that the question was admissible stating:
The honesty of the witness was in question, and the fact, if true,
that he had been guilty of taking other people's money out of the
bank without their consent and using it, during the period of time
involved in this case, would tend to impeach his character and
31. United States v. Byrne, 422 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Pa. 1976),modifled, 560 F.2d 601 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
32. United States v. Alberti, 470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919
(1973).
33. United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980).
34. The Federal Rules of Evidence have been enacted, with modifications, in twenty-
two states. See infra note 35.
35. The states following the rule verbatim include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, New Mexico and Wyoming. The states that have adopted the rule with
minor changes are Maine, Montana, Ohio, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota.
The states that have adopted the rule with more substantial changes are Alaska, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. 3 D. LOUISELL &
C. MUELLER, supra note 14; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE §§ 608-09 (1981).
36. For a comprehensive discussion of the way these states and others with significantly
different versions of Rule 608 have interpreted the rule, see J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 35, at § 608[09].
37. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 255 Ark. 1028, 504 S.W.2d 747 (1974) (permissible to ask
the witness if he had shot a man); Polk v. State, 252 Ark. 320, 478 S.W.2d 738 (1972) (per-
missible to ask the witness about the act of robbery); Black v. State, 250 Ark. 604, 466
S.W.2d 463 (1971) (permissible to ask the witness about the act of rape); Hughes v. State,
249 Ark. 805, 461 S.W.2d 940 (1971) (permissible to ask the witness if he had taken some
money from another man); McAlister v. State, 99 Ark. 604, 139 S.W. 684 (1911) (permissible
to ask the witness about the act of assassination).
38. The statutory definitions of the act of theft are found in ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-
2201 to -2209 (1977). Section 41-2202 consolidates various separate offenses into the one
offense of theft. Sections 41-2203 through 41-2209 define theft of property, theft of services,
theft by receiving, and theft of trade secrets.
39. 160 Ark. 530, 255 S.W. 31 (1923).
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discredit him as a witness.4°
The adoption of Rule 608(b) by the Arkansas legislature in
1976, brought about a major change in Arkansas law. Rule 608(b)
operated to restrict the type of instances of misconduct which could
be inquired into during cross-examination. Under the rule, only
prior bad acts probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness may be
the subject of cross-examination.
The rule was first applied in Arkansas in Cox v. State.4' The
Supreme court in Cox stated that inquiry about the prior bad act of
robbery was clearly impermissible under Rules 608 and 609, and
that decisions to the contrary, decided prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, were no longer applicable.42 The court
did not state its reasoning nor discuss the relevancy issue in connec-
tion with the prior bad act of robbery.
The supreme court faced the issue again in Gustafson v. State,4 3
and the court interpreted Rule 608 for the first time. The court
overturned Cox and held that it is unequivocally permissible to ask
in good faith about the act of robbery because robbery is "an act of
dishonesty."'  The court went on to state:
[M]isconduct relating to truthfulness would include forgery, per-
jury, bribery, false pretense and embezzlement. Obviously, some
misconduct would not bear on truthfulness. For example, mur-
der, manslaughter or assault do not per se relate to dishonesty.
Burglary and breaking and entering would not be such miscon-
duct unless the crime involved the element of theft. [Citation
omitted.] We believe that theft, as it is defined in the Arkansas
Criminal Code, involves dishonesty.45
In Rhodes v. State," the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
cross-examination into the witness' shoplifting incidents should
have been allowed because appellant's attorney had relied on the
40. Id. at 541, 255 S.W. at 35.
41. 264 Ark. 608, 573 S.W.2d 906 (1978).
42. Id. at 610, 573 S.W.2d at 907.
43. 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979).
44. Id. at 291, 590 S.W.2d at 860.
45. Id. at 288-89, 590 S.W.2d at 859, citing ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2201 to -2253
(1977). The statutes cited by the court denominate the various separate offenses which are
consolidated into one offense-theft. The separate offenses expressly mentioned by the stat-
ute are larceny, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion,
receiving stolen property, shoplifting, and "other similar offenses." Theft of property is sub-
sequently defined in § 41-2203 as containing the element of deception. Theft of services is
also defined as containing the element of deception in § 41-2204.
46. 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (1982).
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court's previous interpretation of Rule 608(b) in Gustafson. The
court, however, prospectively modified that interpretation of Rule
608(b) by distinguishing acts probative of truthfulness from those
probative of dishonesty.47 Specific instances of misconduct clearly
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness may be the subject of
inquiry on cross-examination, whereas specific instances of miscon-
duct probative only of dishonesty may not.4 8 The court cited lead-
ing commentators on evidence, including McCormick4 9  and
Weinstein °50 to support the view that cross-examination into prior
bad acts should be limited to inquiries concerning specific instances
of conduct which indicate a lack of truthfulness as opposed to con-
duct merely indicative of an "absence of respect for the property
rights of others."'
The court gave three policy reasons for its decision. The first
was the risk that the defendant would be convicted merely because
of a reputation for bad acts which had no relevance to veracity. 2
The second was the fear that the Gustafson ruling circumvented the
basic aim of Rules 608 and 609 which is to induce defendants to
take the stand.5 3 The third was the court's desire to interpret the
Uniform Rules as other states have interpreted them and as federal
jurisdictions have interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
court stated that "[n]o other jurisdiction has interpreted the Uni-
form Rules or Federal Rules to allow cross-examination on specific
acts of shoplifting. 54
47. Id. at 207, 634 S.W.2d at 110.
48. Id.
49. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 42, at 82 (1954). The court stated: "McCormick
views misconduct, 'such as false swearing, fraud and swindling' as relevant to truthfulness."
276 Ark. at 207, 634 S.W.2d at 110.
50. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 35, at § 608[05]. The court quoted various
passages from WEINSTEIN. 276 Ark. at 207-09, 634 S.W.2d at 110-11.
51. 276 Ark. at 209, 634 S.W.2d at I11.
52. 276 Ark. at 210, 634 S.W.2d at 11. When the defendant is the witness, there is the
risk that he will be convicted for being a "bad person" or because the jury becomes con-
vinced that he has a propensity for crime. See generall, D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 14, at § 305. This policy reason is only applicable if the witness being cross-examined is
also the defendant.
53. 276 Ark. at 210, 634 S.W.2d at I ll. The argument is made that if counsel is allowed
to delve into prior bad acts without restrictions then the defendant as well as other witnesses
will be less likely to cooperate with the fact-finding process by testifying for fear of being
harassed or embarrassed on the witness stand. See generally D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER,
supra note 14, at § 305.
54. 276 Ark. at 210, 634 S.W.2d at 111. Yet the court failed to cite decisions which had
refused to allow questions pertaining to prior acts of shoplifting in interpreting Rule 608(b).
The court did cite United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977), which held that acts
of shoplifting or petty larceny are "not an indicium of a propensity toward testamonial dis-
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The dissent55 in Rhodes interpreted the majority's decision to
hold that, in an effort to impeach a witness, acts of theft may not be
inquired into upon the basis that theft has no relevance to the char-
acter trait of truthfulness.5 6 The majority had used the word "shop-
lifting"57 but the dissent pointed out that, in Arkansas, shoplifting is
just one of several categories of theft.5" Therefore, in holding that
incidents of shoplifting may not be inquired into, the majority is
essentially holding that incidents of theft may not be inquired into.
The dissent argued that a relationship exists between stealing and
untruthfulness,59 and that evidence that a witness has stolen before
should be admissible to give the jury all relevant information neces-
sary to assess the witness' credibility.6 °
In prospectively modifying its prior interpretation of Rule
608(b), the Rhodes court has limited the scope of a cross-examiner's
impeachment of witnesses and has created a precedent which leaves
many questions unanswered. One important question is the effect of
Rhodes with respect to inquiry into other enumerated acts of theft in
the Arkansas Statutes.6' Although the majority mentioned only
shoplifting, they also made the broad statement that "we would hold
that while an absence of respect for the property rights of others is
an undesirable trait, it does not directly indicate an impairment of
the trait of truthfulness ... -" The statement may be true, but in
Arkansas some acts of theft are statutorily defined to include the
element of deception.63 It is conceivable that one who would
deceive might also tend to be untruthful. If a person will use deceit
to steal another man's property, then he might be expected to give
false testimony when it is to his advantage.
Under Gustafson, a trial court had discretion to determine if a
honesty," however, that case was discussing the interpretation of Rule 609 rather than
608(b). 561 F.2d at 806.
55. Justice Hickman and Justice Hays dissented in part. Justice Hickman also wrote the
en banc opinion in Gustafson.
56. 276 Ark. at 212-13, 634 S.W.2d at 113.
57. The majority in Rhodes said "cross-examination would not be allowed on specific
acts of shoplifting for which there was no conviction." Id. at 210, 634 S.W.2d at 111.
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2202 (1977).
59. "[Tihieves tend to lie." 276 Ark. at 216, 634 S.W.2d at 114.
60. Id.
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2201 to -2253 (1977). The enumerated acts of theft are set
out in note 45.
62. 276 Ark. at 215, 634 S.W.2d at I11.
63. Eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2203 (1977), reads in pertinent part: "A person com-
mits theft of property if he. . .(b) knowingly obtains the property of another person, by
deception . ..with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof."
[Vol. 6:321
1983] EVIDENCE RULE 608(b) 329
particular act of theft was probative of truthfulness. Now, after
Rhodes, a trial court may be divested of this discretionary role if the
act involved is one of theft. Different individuals have differing
views of the type of behavior that shows a propensity to lie. Some
believe a person who commits an act of theft will tend to lie while
others believe he will not. Is there a middle ground? Do some acts
of theft, specifically those involving the element of deception, indi-
cate an impaired ability to tell the truth while others do not? Al-
though that question could well be answered in the affirmative, in
Arkansas a line has been drawn that purports to prevent inquiry
into all prior acts of theft.
Shelly Kim Kritz

